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Caught Between the Scylla and Charybdis:' Ameliorating
the Collision Course of Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Rights and Religious Free Exercise Rights
in the Public Workplace*
l. INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, religious individuals and institutions have increasingly brought actions against the application of civil rights laws, particularly those laws that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. 2
Correspondingly, and perhaps reciprocally, advocates for the prohibition
of discrimination based on sexual orientation have increasingly become
less tolerant of religious belief, particularly in the workplace. 3 Recently,
*

Copyright© 2002 Josiah N. Drew.
I. According to Greek mythology, epic mariners Jason and Odysseus successfully navigated
the narrow strait between two equally imposing forces: Scylla, the six-headed and twelve-legged
monster that would roll rocks upon passing ships and devour crew members; and Charybdis, the terrible whirlpool monster that gulped down large portions of the surrounding sea, devouring ships and
striking fear into these vessels' sailors. See generally THF LiBRARY OF GREEK MYTHOLOGY llY
APOLLODORUS (BOOK I) 25 (Keith Aldrich trans., Coronado Press 1975). See also Hugo VanDer
Molen, The Voyage of the Argonauts, at http://home-l.tiscali.nl/-molen/scripophily/texts/
USA,Argonaut.html (last modified Dec. 28, 200 I); Greek Mythology: Odysseus. at
http://members.aol.com/GoddessCal/odym.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2001).
2. See. e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that the government had a sufficiently compelling interest in eradicating racial discrimination where the Internal
Revenue Service denied tax-exempt status to this non-profit, private, religious institution that prescribed racially discriminatory admissions standards); EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d
1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 1982) (reviewing a case in which a religious publishing house, claiming belief
in a religious doctrine that prohibited church members from bringing lawsuits against the church,
dismissed employees in retaliation for filing discrimination claims); Voluntary Ass'n of Religious
Leaders, Churches, & Orgs. v. Waihee, 800 F. Supp. 882, 883 (D. Haw. 1992) (dismissing challenge
to state statute prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in employment); Madsen v. Erwin, 481
N.E.2d 1160, 1161, 1166 (Mass. 1985) (determining that a state law prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination in employment unnecessarily burdened a church-published newspaper's free exercise
right); State ex rei. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 846, 847 n.4 (Minn.
1985) (stating that health club owners who insisted on only hiring employees whose religious beliefs
were consistent with their religious beliefs were required to comply with the state law prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, and marital status).
3. See generally Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Serv., Inc., 244 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 200 I) (holding
that the state medical facility is not required to reasonably accommodate a state employee's religious
aversion to counseling homosexual clients because to hold otherwise would pose an undue burden
upon the state employer); Altman v. Minn. Dep't of Corrs., 251 F.3d 1199 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the Minnesota Department of Corrections violated its employees' First Amendment right to free
speech rather than free exercise when those employees suffered adverse employment action for
bringing their Bibles to a gay sensitivity training seminar); Philips v. Collings, 256 F.3d 843 (8th
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public employers have found it increasingly difficult to navigate through
these clashing phenomena, and now with the advent of state-endorsed
gay 4 rights sensitivity training, public employers are caught in a culture
war with both sides-religious advocates and gay advocates-engulfing
employers with their respective claims of superior rights.
Because, historically, freedom of religion was the first right entrenched within our jurisprudential framework, and because gay antidiscrimination rights are among the newest or latest rights, this Comment
primarily focuses on how gay rights (or the "weaker" of these two clashing rights) may, without mandating acceptance by those who are morally
opposed to the gay lifestyle, gain greater social and legal recognition. Although on their face sexual orientation rights and religious rights appear
remarkably opposed to one another, they are in reality quite similar in a
significant number of ways; and therefore, they should be similarly
treated.
This Comment recognizes that comparing religion and sexual orientation may, at first glance, shock the reader and that readers with either a
zealous, gay advocacy agenda, or, conversely, readers with a fundamental religious bent will reject this comparison outright. However, the majority that exists between these two polar views may benefit from a policy framework that recognizes that the state must remain as neutral as
possible in such a culture clash. Polls reveal that a solid majority of
Americans would support gay anti-discrimination legislation. 5 Americans
also fear, however, that the state is prepared to endorse or already has
endorsed a permissive sexual orientation value system. 6 Vermont's Senator James M. Jeffords aptly aligned these two, somewhat conflicting sentiments when he declared that "[p]eople don't want to go too far on
changing marriage and traditional relationships .... But the feeling is
when someone wants to work someplace, they ought to be able to get a
job." 7

Cir. 200 I) (holding that a Missouri Department of Social Services supervisor violated her employee's § 1983 civil rights where, upon learning of that employee's religious views on homosexuality, that supervisor took adverse employment action); Hyman v. Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528
(W.O. Ky. 2001) (holding that the city of Louisville's sexual orientation anti-discrimination statute
does not violate, on free exercise grounds, a private employer's desire to refuse employment to homosexuals).
4. For the purposes of this Comment, "gay" is an inclusive term referring to not only male
homosexuals, but also to lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered persons.
5. See Human Rights Campaign: Working for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Tram-gender
Equal Rights, at http://www.hrc.org/issues/federal_leg/enda/background/index.asp (last visited Dec.
3,2001).
6. See infra Part III.
7. Eric Schmitt, Senators Reject Both Job-Bias Ban and Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
II, 1996, at A I.
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Part II of this Comment provides a basic understanding of free exercise jurisprudence and also describes the current state of sexual orientation discrimination law. Part II also goes beyond the law and attempts to
provide a snapshot of contemporary American society's take on religious
and gay rights. Part III chronicles the advent of gay sensitivity training
into the workplace. This section, by explicating the Eighth Circuit's
Altman v. Minnesota Department of Corrections 8 case, also highlights
how this educational movement provokes a culture clash of values, particularly in the public workplace. As mentioned above, because rights
based upon sexual orientation is the relatively new player in respect to
constitutionally enshrined religious rights, Part IV focuses on the misguided constitutional tact upon which many gay rights advocates have
exerted much energy. Specifically, Part IV asserts that attempting to elevate sexual orientation discrimination directly into the U.S. Constitution
through the path of equal protection is, legally and socially, the wrong
approach. Part V introduces a proposal. Because gay rights advocates desire more than just legal equality in society, Part V prescribes a path by
which gay rights advocates may achieve such equality without infringing
upon others' rights. Specifically, Part V advocates (1) that, in light of
major American social movements, particularly the American civil rights
movement, gay rights advocates should look to religion rather than spurn
religion in their quest for equality; (2) that legislative means rather than
judicial means should be used to gain the ultimate end of equality; and
(3) that, because religion and sexual orientation are substantially similar
in significant ways, legislative enactments should be "principly" based
upon the First Amendment's religion clauses. Such a principled legislative framework is better than simply passing anti-discrimination legislation based on sexual orientation because it not only provides that sexual
orientation, like religion, should be relegated to the private sphere where
most Americans feel it properly belongs but also because it assures other
factions (particularly religious factions within our heavily pluralistic society) that the state will not endorse or promote either the rejection or acceptance of gay rights. In short, the state will remain neutral; or, in other
words, the state will not affirmatively promote or endorse gay sensitivity
programs in a public setting any more than it cannot promote religious
sensitivity. Part VI offers a brief conclusion.

8. 251 F .3d 1199 (8'th Cir. 2001 ).
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II. BACKGROUND

A. The First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause

The First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that the state "shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof .... "9 Because the Constitution restrains government action, these First Amendment protections are "most pertinent to
religious disputes that occur within public-sector workplaces." 10 The free
exercise clause, on its face, bars the government from infringing upon a
person's right to hold private religious beliefs. 11
The free exercise clause also bars the government from infringing
upon a person's right to engage in religiously motivated conduct 12 unless
the government can show a compelling interest why it should do so. 13
Therefore, the government, in its role as employer, may infringe upon
constitutionally protected religious conduct in two notable circumstances. First, a government employer may prohibit or limit religious
conduct that hinders the performance of that public employer's mission.
Second, due to the establishment clause, government agencies should not
permit their employees to engage in religious conduct when that conduct
may reasonably convey the impression to the public that the government
is supporting or endorsing religion or religious practices. 14
9. U.S. CoNST. amend. I (emphasis added). The first clause is referred to as the establishment clause; the second clause is referred to as the free exercise clause. Under the incorporation
principles of the Fourteenth Amendment, both of these clauses are applicable to the several states.
See Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 ( 1940).
10. MICHAEL WOLF ET AL., RELIGION IN THE WORKPLACE: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 5 ( 1998) (footnote omitted). Although private sector employers generally have more leeway than public sector employers to squelch their employees' First
Amendment religious rights, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does provide employees some
religious protection in the private sector. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1994 ).
II. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding ofthe Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1488 (1990).
12. See id.
13. See 5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 106-107 (3d ed. 1999). From its 1963 decision of Sherbert v. Verner,
the Supreme Court applied a heightened level of scrutiny even when analyzing the government's
incidental imposition of burdens upon religious conduct. In 1990, however, the Supreme Court returned to its pre-Sherbert position in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith, by holding that unless the free exercise clause is invoked in conjunction with other constitutional protections (hybrid rights), the government need not assert a compelling interest as justification of its actions if religion is only incidentally affected by a neutral, generally applicable law. Only
when the objective of a law is to regulate religion and if that regulation places a substantial burden
upon religious conduct should the compelling interest test apply. See WOLFE, supra note 10, at 14547. See also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 ( 1997); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 ( 1993); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990); Sherbertv. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
14. See WOLFE, supra note 10, at 6. Government agencies need not permit such conduct be-
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B. Sexual Orientation Discrimination Jurisprudence
1.

Federallaw

Although federal law provides basic legal protection against public
and private employment discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion, national origin, or disability, there is neither a constitutional provision nor a federal statute "that explicitly bars discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation." 15
With the Employment Non-Discrimination Act ("ENDA"), Congress, throughout the 1990s, has introduced and debated passage of a
statutory scheme to protect against sexual orientation discrimination in
the workplace. 16 This legislation, however, has consistently failed to
pass. 17 Currently, EDNA's reintroduction is scheduled before the 107th
Congress on July 31, 2002. 18 It should be noted, however, that pursuant
to a recent executive order, employers within the federal public sector
may not discriminate upon the basis of sexual orientation. 19
2. State and local law

Most civil rights legislation designed to protect against sexual orientation discrimination has taken root at the state and local levels of govemment.20 Currently, twelve states and the District of Columbia prohibit
such workplace discrimination. 21 Covering discrimination not only in
cause the government would then breach the principle of religious neutrality at the heart of the estab1ishment clause. See id.
15. Thomas H. Barnard & Timothy J. Downing, Emerging Law on Sexual Orientation and
Fmplovmenr, 29lJ. MEM. L. R1 v. 555,557 ( 1999).
16. See id at 557.
17. "FNDA was introduced in the 103d Congress in 1994 in House Bill4636. H.R. 4636,
I 03d Con g. ( 1994 ). The Bill was reintroduced in the I 04th Congress in 1995 in House Bill 1863.
H.R. 1863, I 04th Con g. ( 1995 ). It also was reintroduced in the tirst session of the 105th Congress in
1997 in both the House and the Senate. See H.R. 1858, I 05th Cong. ( 1997); S. 869, I 05th Cong.
( 1997)." Barnard & Downing, supra note 15, at 565 n.50. With bipartisan support, the Bill was introduced and failed bcf(Jrc the I 06th Congress. See H.R. 2355, I 06th Cong. ( 1999); S. I 06, I 06th
Cong. ( 1999). ld at 565 n.51.
I K See H.R. 2692, I 07th Cong. (2002); S. 1284, I 07th Cong. (2002). See also Human Rights

Campaign.·

Working filr

Lesbian.

Gay,

Bisexual

and

Transgender

Equal

Rights,

at

http://www.hrc.org/issucs/ti.:deral_leg/enda!index.asp (last visited Dec. 3, 200 I).
19. See Barnard & Downing, supra note 15, at 557.
20. States, of course, have power to enact such legislation under their reserved, Tenth
Amendment police powers. See. e.g, David B. Cruz, Note, Piety and Prejudice: Free Exercise Exc:mplion From Laws Prohihiring Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1176, 1183
( 1994 ). The Tenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
21. These include California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See Cal. Lab. Code§
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employment, but also in housing and public accommodations, most of
these laws are broader in scope than ENDA would be. Additionally,
eight states have executive orders that bar discrimination in public employment based upon sexual orientation. 22 Finally, in addition to state
law, over 165 municipalities and counties have enacted antidiscrimination legislation based upon sexual orientation. 23
C. Snapshots of the Current Landscape

Because religious rights and gay rights separately, let alone collectively, engender such controversy in our society, a brief examination of

1102.1 (1997); Conn. Gen. Stat.§§ 46a-8lc (1997); D.C. Code Ann.§ 1-2512 (1997); Haw. Rev.
Stat.§§ 368-1, 378-2 (1996); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 98 (Law. Co-op. 1996); Minn. Stat.§§
363.03,363.12 (1996); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.§§ 354-A:7, :8 (1998); N.J. Rev. Stat.§§ 10:2-1, :5-4,
:5-12 (1996); R.I. Gen. Laws§§ 28-5-2,28-5-7 (1996); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 3, § 495 (1996); Wis. Stat.
§ 111.36 ( 1996). "The State of Maine had a law on the books prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation; however, the law was overturned by the voters of Maine in a statewide referendum. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, §§ 4552,4553 (West 1997) (repealed 1998)." Barnard & Downing, supra note 15, at 557 n.S. See also Carey Goldberg, Maine Voters Repeal a Law on Gay Rights,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998, at A 1 (reporting voter repeal of Maine law that banned discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation in housing, employment, credit, and places of public accommodation).
22. These states include: Colorado, Louisiana, Maryland, New Mexico, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Washington. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 90-13-98 (Colo. 1990); Exec. Order No.
Ewe 92-7 (La. 1992) (expired 1996); Exec. Order No. 01.01.1993.16 (Md. 1993); Exec. Order No.
85-15 (N.M. 1985); Exec. Order No. 28.1 (N.Y. 1993); Exec. Order No. 83-64 (Ohio 1983); Exec.
Order No. 1988-1 (Pa. 1988); Exec. Order No. 85-09 (Wash. 1985). See Barnard & Downing, supra
note 15, at 558 n.6.
23. Among the cities having such ordinances are some of the larger cities in the United
States, including: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Philadelphia, Detroit, Dallas, San Diego, San Francisco, Atlanta, Boston, Phoenix, Denver, Baltimore, Minneapolis, St. Paul, St. Louis, Kansas City, Portland, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, San Jose, Cleveland, and Columbus (Ohio). See Phoenix, Ariz., Ordinance G-3558 (July 8, 1992); L.A.,
Cal., Mun. Code ch. IV, art. 12 (1979); San Diego, Cal., Ordinance 0-17453 (Apr. 16,
1990); S.F., Cal., Admin. Code art. 33, § 3301 et seq. (1987); San Jose, Cal., Affirmative
Action Guidelines, Resolution 58076 (Feb. 5, 1985); Denver, Colo., City Code § 28-91 et
seq. (1990); Atlanta, Ga., City Charter, 1973 Ga. Laws, pt. 2188 (1986); Chicago, Ill.,
Mun. Code ch. 199 et seq. (1988); Baltimore, Md., City Code art. 4, §§ 9(16), 12(8)
(1988); Boston, Mass., Code tit. 12, ch. 40 (1984); Minneapolis, Minn., Code tit. 7, chs.
139, 141 (1975); St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code ch. 183 (1990); St. Louis, Mo., Ordinance
62710 (Oct. 6, 1992); N.Y., N.Y., Admin. Code tit. 8 (1993); Cleveland, Ohio, Ordinance
77-94 (Mar. 23, 1994 ); Columbus, Ohio, City Code ch. 2325 ( 1984 ); Portland, Or., Resolution 31510 (1974); Phila., Pa., Fair Practices Ordinance ch. 9-1100 (1982); Pittsburgh,
Pa., Code tit. 6, ch. 651, art. V (I 990); Dallas, Tex., Ordinance 22318 (Jan. 1995)
(amending Dallas City Code ch. 34, art. V, §§ 34-35); Milwaukee, Wis., Discrimination
Ordinance ch. 109-15 (Dec. 22, 1987). Such laws, however, are notjust on the books of
large cities. Indeed, in Ohio alone, the small towns of Athens, Cleveland Heights, Lakewood, North Olmsted, Oberlin, Westlake, and Yellow Springs have such laws on the
books. See Cleveland Heights, Ohio, Ordinance 77-94 (Mar. 23, 1994); Yellow Springs,
Ohio, Town Charter§ 29 (Nov. 1979); North Olmstead, Ohio, Ordinance 96-154. Moreover, small cities, such as Youngstown, Ohio; Toledo, Ohio; and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania also have such laws on the books.
Barnard & Downing, supra note I 5, at 558 n.7.
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the legal framework that supports these respective rights is insufficient to
understand current American temperament. Therefore, the following section provides a cursory glimpse of the current "culture-scape" in regard
to these two issues.
1. State of the secular and religious climate

Because American society aspires to be a democratic and pluralistic
society, it may be fairly characterized as a healthily schizophrenic society. Americans cling to their secular pursuits, which have undisputedly
spurred tremendous legal, scientific, and technological innovations. 24
Secularism, like religious factions, enjoys a non-cohesive variety of adherents: atheists, humanists, materialists, etc., to name just a few. Given
this affinity for secular pursuits, it is not surprising that virtually all sociologists have noted that secularism's influence, for decades or perhaps
centuries, has been on the rise in Western culture.Z 5
Yet, despite secularism's increasing role in modem society, religious
discussion in the American public sphere has, if anything, become less
taboo and more avant-garde recently. 26 The two candidates in the 2000
presidential election provide an example of this trend on a national scale.
Republican candidate George W. Bush proudly shared his Born Again
Christian insights with the electorate, and stated that Jesus was his favorite philosopher. 27 Bush's opponent, Democratic candidate Al Gore, disclosed that he often approaches problems with the religious frame of reference: "What would Jesus do?" 28
Additionally, the wake of September 11 may send more than "shock"
waves of people to the nation's churches, mosques, and synagogues.
Some sociologists, in fact, favorably compare the current state of affairs
to times of past Great Awakenings. 29 Pollsters also claim that spiritual
momentum, "spurred by Americans searching for deeper meaning amid
material excess[,]" continues to snowball. 30 In any event, one thing is
24. See, e.g, Wang Gungwu, Limits of Secularism, THE STRAITS TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at
35.
25. See id.
26. See, e.g, Kent Greenawalt, Religion and American Political Judgments, 36 WAKE
FOREST L. RFV. 401,402 (2001 ).
27. See Hanna Rosin, Bush's 'Christ Moment' Is Put to Political Test by Christians; Act of
Faith or Partisan Ploy, It Draws Faithful·.,. Attention, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1999, at Al4.
28. See Richard Perez-Petildna, Lieberman Seeks Greater Role ji>r Religion in Public Life,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28,2000, at Al4.
29. See Jenn Burleson, Will Terrorist Attacks Bring True Revival, ROANOKE TIMES AND
WORLD NEWS, Oct. 8, 200 l, at C l.
30. Rebecca Goldsmith, How Long Will the Candles Burn?, NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE,
Sept. 24, 2001. Approximately 95% of all Americans profess a belief in God (citing consistent
Gallup poll findings even prior to the September ll attacks). See, e.g., George Gallup, Jr., Religion
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clear: American society may not be easily reduced to the polar opposites
of secularism and religion. Rather, Americans tend to fall upon a continuum between these two ideologies, and this, in tum, tends to create a
healthily schizophrenic society.

2. Glimpse of the gay equality climate
A glimpse of the diverse culture-scape is naturally helpful to provide
some context to America's sexual orientation anti-discrimination laws.
But specific inquiry into the legal landscape is required. Currently, gay
equality jurisprudence in American law is incoherent. Although an increasing number of states and municipalities 31 prohibit the use of a person's sexual orientation as a basis of discrimination, 32 many states,
firmly based in the Supreme Court's Bowers v. Hardwick33 holding that
upheld the constitutionality of sodomy statutes, still maintain the traditional proscriptions of homosexual conduct. This line of gay jurisprudence provides a sharp contrast with popular culture where critically acclaimed television programs, such as The Ellen Show and Will and
Grace, feature openly gay protagonists. 34
Moreover, for courts to add another layer of legal analysis, particularly First Amendment religious rights analysis, to this mixed cultural
landscape and increasingly complex scheme of gay rights jurisprudence
creates an exceptionally complex quagmire through which public employers must navigate. Ultimately, the divisive force of these two stances
can gnaw not only at society in general but also splinter specific institutions. For example, even the ACLU has experienced how divisive these
forces can be. In the gay rights versus religious rights landmark case of
Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown University, 35 the national ACLU affiliate, from an antidiscrimination perspective, filed an amicus brief on behalf of the gay
students group. The local D.C. chapter of the ACLU, on the other hand,
filed an amicus emphasizing the Catholic university's First Amendment
freedom to express religious values. 36 Cases such as Georgetown set up a

in America: Will the Vitality of Churches Be the Surprise of the Next Century?, TilE PUBLIC
Oct.-Nov. 1995, at 1-8.
31. See infra Part II.C.l.
32. See Walter J. Walsh, The Fearful Symmetry of Gay Rights, Religious Freedom, and Racial Equality, 40 How. L.J. 513,529 (1997).
33. 478 u.s. 186 (1986).
34. See The Rosie O'Donnell Show (syndicated television broadcast, Dec. 6, 2001) (featuring
Phil Donahue, a noted day-time television pioneer, discussing how far gays have come in gaining
social acceptance).
35. 536 A.2d I (D.C. 1987) (en bane).
36. See Walsh, supra note 32, at 516.
PERSPECTIVE,
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classic constitutional collision: under the First Amendment's free exercise clause, the religious group claims the liberty to exclude and express
its disapproval of another group; while under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, the excluded, gay rights group clamors
for equal treatment. 37 Cases that pit these two rights against one another
certainly guarantee that "discrimination in the workplace on the basis of
sexual orientation could become one of the hottest topics in the field of
employment law in the next five to ten years." 38
3. The advent ofgay sensitivity training in the workplace

As early as 1992, the U.S. Census Bureau revealed that at least 1.5
million households in America had self-identified their homes as homosexual domestic partnerships. 39 Because the law could offer only limited
equality to America's increasingly diverse workforce, many gay rights
advocates sounded a clarion call to educate rather than legislate. 40 Enter
gay sensitivity training. By the mid-l990s, advocates, proclaiming that
the business community could affirmatively combat homophobia and
heterosexism, 41 and that the gay community need no longer tolerate the
aggregate losses incurred by sexual orientation discrimination, began
educating employers and employees about sexual orientation issues. 42
Specifically, advocates reasonably convinced employers that gays are
likely to be less productive employees where they ( 1) expend too much
unproductive energy to "stay in the closet"; (2) experience a lack of job
satisfaction in an environment of fear and mistrust; and (3) expenence
undue stress in an implicitly heterosexist environment. 43

37. See William N. Eskcridge, Jr., Symposium: Group Conflict and the Constitution· Race,
Sexuality, and Religion A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions o(Liherty and Equality in American Puhlic Law, I 06 YALE L.J. 2411, 2415 ( 1997).
38. Barnard & Downing, supra note 15, 576.
39. See Susan Spielman and Liz Winfield, Making Sexual Orientation Part of Diversity, 49
TRAINING AND DEVJ·:LOPMI·NT 50 ( 1995).
40. See BRIAN MCNAUGHT, GAY ISSUES IN TilE WORKPLACE xiii (1993) (discussing where
prominently representative companies such as AT&T, Bell Communications Research, Lotus, LeviStraus, and MCA took such measures against heterosexism and homophobia in the workplace).
41. Definitions of heterosexism vary. Some advocates describe it as the assumption that everyone is or ought to be heterosexual. See MCNAUGIIT, supra note 40, at 54; see also Spielman &
Winfield, supra note 39. Others align it more closely with invidious racism when they define it as
"policies and practices which elevate heterosexuality and subordinate homosexuality." See Richard
Hunt, Have Homosexual Rights in the Workplace Gone Too Far?, at www.antipas.org/news/world/
homos.html (Nov. 7, 2001 ).
42. See generally MCNAIIGIIT, supra note 40.
43. See McNAUCiiiT, supra note 40, at 1-11; see also Spielman & Winfield, supra note 39.
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4. The content of gay sensitivity training
Most gay-rights advocates can agree on the following core content:
(1) a gay presenter is preferable to a heterosexual presenter because he or
she can convey that homosexuals are normal and competent; (2) human
resources and management must support the training; (3) statistics and
studies should be used to persuade trainees; and (4) attendance should
probably be mandatory to ensure that attending gays will not be harassed
or stigmatized and to ensure that those who have objecting personal beliefs will have to at least listen. 44 Some seminars particularly address the
double standards that heterosexuals place upon gays in the workplace. 45
The Gays and Lesbians in the Workplace seminar, for example, informs
employees that heterosexual privileges should apply equally to gays, including: ( 1) the right to marry; (2) the right to kiss affectionately on the
street; (3) the right to children without any questions; (4) the right to custody of children if a partner dies; (5) the right to be sexual with your
partner without breaking the law. 46
Of course, the gay sensitivity approach is not without its detractors.
Newspaper columns and editorials reveal that some workers are not
happy with this educational approach. For instance, one person lauded
the actions of fifty Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory workers who recently walked out on a homosexual diversity
speaker. 47 Recently, a journalist labeled this educational approach as
"sinister" when it is sanctioned by the state (for example, where Maoist
China employed coercion, deprivation, and torture to convert its citizens
to Communism in its cultural revolution camps). 48 According to this
writer, American sensitivity trainers, fortunately, have not yet had these
49
sinister means available to them.

44. See Spielman & Winfield, supra note 39.
45. See Cyberfeds, Employees Challenge Sexual Orientation Training, at www.feds.com/
nll_lib/fealfea0208.htm#article 16 (last visited Mar. 5, 2002).
46. See ACLJ Files Suit Against Minnesota Department Corrections, at www.aclj.org/news
/NR_98040 !.asp (Apr. I, 1998). The ACLJ adds another factor: the right to be offended when heterosexuals discuss weddings or engagements from their perspective. See id.
4 7. See Mary Ann Stager, Editorial, Insensitivity Just Another Label, IDAHO FALLS POST
REG., June 8, 2000, at A8.
48. See Charles Krauthammer, Editorial, The 'How-To' Society, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1993,
at A25. Krauthammer recalled how about "(f]ive years ago, a religious student at the University of
Michigan expressed the view that homosexuality is immoral. He was made to recant and ordered a
dose of sensitivity training. This will make him broad-minded." !d.
49. See id
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III. A REVEALING TIP OF THE ICEBERG: ALTMAN, THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S
GAY SENSITIVITY TRAINING CASE HIGHLIGHTS TENSIONS IN THE
PUBLIC WORKPLACE

By the late 1990s, the gay sensitivity training movement no longer
remained in the private employment workplace. This educational movement also grew within the public employment sphere. Such a development, on its face, appears consistent with the growth of state sexual orientation anti-discrimination laws. Therefore, it is not surprising that
Minnesota, a state which passed such anti-discrimination legislation, 50
provides the setting for an exemplary case which exposes the contemporary public workplace's struggle to effectively placate the tension between religious free exercise and freedom from sexual orientation discrimination.
A. Events Leading up to the Lawsuit

In light ofMinnesota's designation of a "Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and
Transgender Pride Month," 51 a training coordinator with the Minnesota
Department of Corrections facility in Shakopee ("MCFS") persuaded the
facility warden, in mid-1997, to include a program dealing with issues of
gays and lesbians in the workplace at MCFS's next regularly scheduled
training session. 52 Thomas Altman, an employee of MCSF, "sent [the
warden] an e-mail objecting to the mandatory nature of this program and
protest[ ed] that it would 'raise deviant sexual behavior for staff to a level
of acceptance and respectability. "' 53
The warden, faced with Altman's objection and rumors that other
staff members objected, issued a memo explaining that this "program
was part of 'the facility's strong commitment to create a work environment where people are treated respectfully, regardless of their individual
differences. "' 54 The warden also countered the implication that the training was designed to tell the staff what their personal beliefs and attitudes
should be. 55 Therefore, attendance was mandatory. 56
Prior to the sensitivity training, Altman and other objecting staff
members reviewed the training material and concluded, according to the
50. See MINN. STAT.§§ 363.03,363.12 (1996).
51. See ACU Files Suit Against Minnesota

Department of Corrections, at
www.aclj.org/news /NR _98040l.asp (Apr. I, 1998).
52. See Altman v. Minn. Dep't ofCorrs., 251 F.3d 1199, 1201 (8th Cir. 2001).
53. /d. at 120 I.
54. Jd
55. See supra Part II.A (discussing how the First Amendment's free exercise clause absolutely prohibits the government's attempt to control belief).
56. See Altman, 251 F.3d at 1201.
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wording of their filed complaint, that the training would be "statesponsored indoctrination designed to sanction, condone, promote, and
otherwise approve behavior and a style of life [they believe to be] immoral, sinful, perverse, and contrary to the teachings of the Bible." 57
Immediately prior to the training, Altman and two other co-workers
met at Altman's home and decided to take their Bibles with them to the
mandatory training as a silent protest and as a support for the discomfort
the materials caused them because of their religious beliefs. 58 During the
training, Altman and his co-workers "read their Bibles, copied scripture,
and participated to a limited extent. They did not disrupt the trainers'
59
presentation." Many of Altman's supervisors attended the meeting, and
none of them complained about his behavior or the behavior of his coworkers, "or told them to stop reading their Bibles." 60
At the end of the training session, two trainers complained to
MCFS's affirmative action officer about Altman's and the others' behavior.61 Based on their conduct at the training session, MCFS issued
Altman and his fellow co-workers formal reprimands. 62 These reprimands made Altman and the others ineligible for promotion for two
years. 63 This was Altman's first negative job performance review. 64

B. The Tension Spurs a Lawsuit to the Eighth Circuit
This Comment only provides a cursory description of how the Eighth
Circuit handled this case because, from this Comment's perspective, it is
the underlying facts and circumstances that gave rise to the Altman case
that are of greater significance than the actual analysis and outcome of
this one case itself. 65

57. Silent Protest of Training Session Was Protected Nonverbal Speech, NAT'L PliH. EMP.
REP., July 5, 2001.

58. See Altman v. Minn. Dep't of Corrs., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXlS 14897, at *6 (D. Minn.
Aug. 9, 1999).
59. Altman, 251 F.3d at 120 I.
60. !d.
61. See Altman, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14897, at *7. Specifically, the reprimands were issued for violating DOC Policies 2-203.78 and 2-203.7C, which respectively provide that
"[e]mployees shall conduct themselves both on and otT the job in a manner that will not bring discredit or criticism to the Department"; and "[ e ]mployees shall not exhibit behavior that demonstrates
prejudice or which has the effect of holding any person, group or organization up to ridicule or contempt." !d. at *7-*8.
62. See Altman, 251 F.3dat 1201-02.
63. See id. at 1202.
64. See Altman, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXlS 14897, at *8.
65. Because more cases like Altman are likely to arise (and not just in the public sector),
practitioners and other interested parties are encouraged to analyze the Eighth Circuit's handling of
this case. See, e.g., Simon J. Nadel, Employment Discrimination--Religion: Religion and Sexual
Orientation at Work May Produce Combustible Combination, 68 U.S.L. WEI,K 2163 ( 1999); Jack S.
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After the MCFS took its adverse employment action against Thomas
Altman and his co-workers, Altman and the others, represented by the
American Center for Legal Justice ("ACLJ"), 66 filed an action against the
Minnesota Department of Corrections and against their supervisors in
their official capacities on several grounds, many of which are beyond
the scope of this Comment. 67 With regard to the pertinent issue of free
exercise, the district court, relying upon reasoning of Employment Division Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith 68 and the
Pickerinl 9 balancing test, granted summary judgment in favor of
Altman and the others. Factually, the court was troubled by the notion
that, prior to and after the gay sensitivity training session, inattentiveness
at MCFS training sessions had never been disciplined. 70 Other employees, for example, at this or other training sessions had read magazines,
fallen asleep, worked on unrelated paperwork, crocheted, and even left
early. 71 MCFS never disciplined these inattentive employees; however,
MCFS did discipline Altman and the others for inattentively but silently
reading their Bibles. 72 While the district court recognized that MCFS
"has a strong interest in preventing harassment based upon sexual orientation,"73 the court emphatically noted that MCFS failed to show how
Altman's and the others' Bible reading directly or even indirectly contributed to or fostered any such harassment; therefore, the court concluded that "judgment in favor of [Altman] is warranted on the issue of
Free Exercise." 74
Yaitayanonta, Note, In State Legislatures We Trust?: The Compelling Interest Presumption andReligious Free txercise Challenges to State Civil Rights Laws, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 886,887 (2001 ).
66. Christian broadcaster, Pat Robertson, founded the ACLJ. See Debra Baker, Acting on
One "s Belief.v: Clash Between Gay Rights and Religious Freedom Spills Over Into Workplace, 86
A.B.A. J. 18 (Jan. 2000). Arguably, the ACLJ is to the "Religious Right" what the ACLU is to the
"Liberal Lett."
67. At the district court level, Altman and his co-workers submitted their complaint claiming
that (i) Defendants had violated their right to free speech as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and as protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (ii) Defendants had violated various rights as
guaranteed by the Minnesota constitution; and (iii) Defendants' reprimand and failure to promote
constituted an unfair employment practice in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, among other claims. See Altman, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14897, at *1-*2.
68. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
69. Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
70. See Altman, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXlS 14897, at *17-*20.
71. See id. at *17-*18.
72. See id
73. /d.at*l9.
74. !d. at * 19-*20. Because the Eighth Circuit could identify no significant burden placed on
Altman's and the others' Bible reading activity, the circuit court reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment on the free exercise issue. See Altman v. Minn. Dep't of Corrs., 251 F .3d 1199,
1203-05 (8th Cir. 2001 ). Specifically, the court stated that "the only burden placed on Appellants
was a requirement they attend a seventy-five-minute training program at which they were exposed to
widely-accepted views that they oppose on faith-based principles. This is not, in our view, a substan-
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IV. WHY EQUAL PROTECTION HOLDS LITTLE HOPE OF RESOLVING THIS
DEBATE

As mentioned above, 75 because the First Amendment's free exercise
clause has enjoyed over 200 years of legal interpretation and analysis and
because all state constitutions provide for the free exercise of religion or
freedom of conscience, 76 this Comment will focus on the newer or lesser
right's-freedom from sexual orientation-based discrimination-plight
in American society at large as well as the public employment sector in
particular. Unfortunately, in an attempt to elevate their claims to constitutional par, gay rights advocates misplace their reliance upon the equal
protection clause. To achieve their ultimate goals, such advocates should
tum toward, rather than away from, the American religious experienceculturally and legally.
Many, if not most, people recognize that gays face serious obstacles
when they seek workplace, housing, marital, adoption, armed forces, and
privacy rights because many current laws and policies classify and negatively impact people according to their gay sexual orientation. Gay rights
advocates, arguing that such classifications trigger equal protection concerns, have sought increased judicial scrutiny for decades. However, focusing so much energy in the equal protection arena is unlikely to grant
these advocates the recognition and rights they seek. Equal protection jurisprudence is inconsistent, disorganized, and appears closed-especially
because courts, since the 1970s, have gotten out of the business of creating new suspect classes.
A. A Brief Review of Equal Protection 's Three- Tiered Framework

The Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause commands
that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." 77 The Fifth Amendment's due process clause
similarly applies to the federal government, which also may not classify

tial burden on their free exercise of religion." !d. at 1204. Although not pertinent to this Comment, it
is worthy to note, however, that the Eight Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Altman's
First Amendment free speech claims. See id. at 1202-03. Therefore, reversal on the free exercise
issue did not prove fatal to Altman and his fellow Bible readers' claims. Of course, as stated at the
outset of Part Ill, this Comment's purpose in exploring the Altman case is not to prove its outcome
or underlying analysis, but rather to expose the growing tension between advancing sexual orientation rights and religious rights in the public workplace. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
75. See supra Parts l & ll.A.
76. See Vaitayanonta, supra note 65, at 902 n.54.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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"individuals in a way which would violate the equal protection clause." 78
In other words, courts, depending on what group is affected, apply different standards when examining group-classifying laws.
1. The rational relationship or rational basis test

This test provides the default or general rule in equal protection
analysis where legislation is presumed valid and "will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest." 79 This lowest tier "is designed to allow even unwise legislation to pass muster easily, because the democratic process, rather than
the courts, is supposed to be the usual means for repealing even foolish
legislation." 80 Therefore, "[m]ost laws-including laws that classify people according to sexual orientation, age, or wealth-will be upheld." 81
2. The heightened or intermediate scrutiny test

Under this standard, courts "will not uphold a [legislative] classification unless they find that the classification has a 'substantial relationship'
to an 'important' government interest."82 Legislative classifications,
based on gender, merit this quasi-suspect classification because such
classifications "very likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women."83 Legislative classifications based on illegitimacy also merit this mid-tiered scrutiny because "illegitimacy is beyond the individual's control and 'bears no relation to the individual's
ability to participate in and contribute to society. "' 84
3. The strict scrutiny test

Courts apply this test when the government classifies by race, national origin, or alienage. 85 Such laws will be sustained "only if they are
[narrowly] tailored to serve a compelling state interest." 86 Courts use this
stricter test when examining such classifications because these minorities
lack the political power necessary to protect their rights in the democratic

78. 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 206 (3d ed. 1999).
79. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
80. EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE
FAlLURE OF CLASS BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 20 ( 1999).
81. /d. at 22.
82. 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 78, at 219.
83. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441.
84. /d. (quoting Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976)).
85. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 78, at 218.
86. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

302

[Volume XVI

process. 87 Strict scrutiny is also applied when examining race, national
origin and alienage-based classifications because these classifications
"are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect
prejudice and antipathy." 88

B. Applying the Three-Tiered Framework to Gays
Although gays assert several reasonable arguments why they meet
the Carotene Products 89 criteria, to argue further upon this constitutional
thread is likely futile for several reasons and should therefore be abandoned for other theories. 9 Clearly, many gay rights advocates desire
more than rational-basis scrutiny, which has been described as "minimal
91
scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact," because "[i]f the Supreme
Court were to decide that gays ... are a suspect class and direct all courts
to apply strict scrutiny to laws that classify according to sexual orientation, virtually all these laws would likely be struck down." 92 However,
courts, including and especially the Supreme Court, have been reluctant
to find that gays are a suspect class and probably never will. Because
gays have difficulty qualifying for heightened status under the factors
outlined in Carotene Products, gays will probably not achieve their equal
treatment goals through an equal protection approach.

°

C. The Carotene Products Qual(fYing Criteria
93

The gist of Carotene Products' famous footnote 4 provides that
certain "discrete and insular minorities" cannot protect themselves from
the pluralistic majority's unfavorable treatment; "[t]herefore the [courts]
must take special care to protect these minorities" from the politically
powerful majority's prejudices. 94 One appellate case in particular provides, arguably, the best precedentiallanguage for finding that gays meet
Carotene Products strict scrutiny criteria.
In Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University, 95 the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals held that Catholic "Georgetown University
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Mode/for

See GERSTMANN, supra note 80, at 21.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
United States v. Carotene Products, 304 U.S. 144 ( 1938). See infra Part IV.B.I.
See infra Part VI for one such alternative theory or proposal.
Gerald Gunther, Forward: In Search (J{ Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I, 8 ( 1972).
GERSTMANN, supra note 80, at 23.
See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
GERSTMANN, supra note 80, at 26.
536 A.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1987). See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text for addi-

92.
91
94.
95.
tional information regarding the controversy that this case spurred in Washington, D.C.

287] ANTI-DISCRIMINATION RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE

303

could not claim a religious freedom exemption from a Washington,
D.C.," sexual orientation anti-discrimination law. 96 As part of her rationale for concurring, Judge Mack stated that "sexual orientation appears to
possess most or all of the characteristics that have persuaded the Supreme Court to apply strict or heightened constitutional scrutiny to legislative classifications under the Equal Protection Clause." 97 Specifically,
the Georgetown court determined ( 1) that there is a long and unfortunate
history of discrimination based on sexual orientation; (2) that available
evidence suggests that sexual orientation is determined by causes not
within the individual's control and not generally subject to change; and
(3) that due to continuing legal and social stigma, gay persons constitute
discrete and insular minorities whose interests are unprotected by political processes. 98 In short, therefore, this appellate court was persuaded
that Carotene Products' ingredients were present in this sexual orientation trumping religious free exercise case, 99 namely: (1) a history of discrimination, (2) immutability of characteristics, and (3) political powerlessness. Another appellate court has yet, however, to be similarly
persuaded, and this situation will not likely change because equal protection proponents and opponents make equally convincing arguments that
each of these three ingredients apply (or do not apply) in the sexual orientation context.
1. History of discrimination

Even most opponents of granting suspect class status to gays concede that gays have experienced discrimination in American society. The
only courts that have addressed this issue squarely have ruled that even
though gays are not a suspect class, they "do agree that homosexuals
have suffered a history of discrimination." 100
Opponents of this rationale, however, do take issue with the degree
of discrimination, because relative to the black slavery experience, which
gave rise to equal protection jurisprudence, gay discrimination has not
been nearly as pervasive and invidious. Further, in more recent history,
society has increasingly been willing to stigmatize those who discriminate against gays rather than stigmatize the gay class itself. 101

96. GERSTMANN, supra note 80, at 5-6 (emphasis added).
97. Georgetown, 536 A.2d at 36.
98. See Walter J. Walsh, The Fearful Symmetry of Gay Rights, Religious Freedom, and Racial Equality, 40 How. L.J. 513,522-523 ( 1997) (citing Georgetown 536 A.2d at 31-39).
99. See supra Part ll.C.2.
100. High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,573 (9th Cir. 1990).
I 0 I. See supra notes 20-23, 46 and accompanying text.
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2. Immutability
Gay rights advocates argue that sexual orientation is immutable because it is a genetically influenced characteristic-not a choice. Opponents, on the other hand, respond that most laws (e.g., anti-sodomy statutes, etc.) do not single out gays because of their orientation, but for their
voluntary behavior. As the Sixth Circuit put it: "Those persons who fall
within the orbit of legislation concerning sexual orientation are so affected not because of their orientation but rather by their conduct which
identifies them as homosexual .... " 102
As mentioned above, gay rights proponents do set forth reasonably
persuasive arguments. Evidence, including scientific evidence, strongly
suggests that "sexual identity is immutable and almost certainly genetically influenced." 103 In the alternative, even if sexual orientation is not
predominantly genetic, proponents undermine whether immutability
should be a qualifying characteristic when "supposedly immutable characteristics ... are as much creations of culture as of genetics. Racism, for
example, is a consequence not of differences in human pigmentation, but
of how those differences are culturally perceived." 104 In fact, many "African-Americans" of mixed ancestry must, at some point in their lives,
"come-out"-they must affirmatively choose whether they self-identify
themselves as white or black. Therefore, like many gays, they are one or
the other because of declaration, not immutability. 105
Opponents, at least based on court results, counter with more persuasive arguments. Opponents on the immutability issue argue that gays are
singled out because they share a common behavior rather than a common
orientation. One commentator on this issue has stated that
[i]f the group seeking ... protection is defined by voluntary behavior
that flouts majoritarian notions of morality, then it seems reasonable to
ask that group to stop engaging in that behavior. Society singles out all
sorts of behavior-based groups for negative treatment-adulterers,
bigamists, and people who use prostitutes, among many other groups.
106
Yet no one would argue that such groups are suspect classes.

102. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 267 (6th Cir.
1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996).
I 03. Jack M. Battaglia, Religion. Sexual Orientation, and Self-Realization: First Amendment
Principles and Anti-Discrimination Laws, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 189, 359 ( 1999).
I 04. See id. at 359 n.l 003.
105. See JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN: RACE, COLOR,
COMMUNITY 28 ( 1995 ).
I 06. GERSTMANN, supra note 80, at 76.
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Most courts have accepted this argument, especially in light of Bowers v. Hardwick 107 and its progeny. 108 Even courts that have not accepted
this argument have figuratively thrown their hands up and determined
that this is not a legally amenable issue, but an issue of science, philosophy, sociology, and so forth. 109 Therefore, within the judicial sphere, the
immutability issue does hold out much promise for gay rights advocates
despite their reasonably persuasive arguments.

3. Political powerlessness
Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer v. Evans 110 sums up one camp of
pervasive judicial thought on this equal-protection-qualifying characteristic:
[B]ecause those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in
disproportionate numbers in certain communities, have high disposable
income, and of course, care about homosexual-rights issues much more
ardently than the public at large, they possess political power much
greater than their numbers .... Quite understandably, they devote this
political power to achieving not merely a ~rudging social toleration, but
1 1
full social acceptance, ofhomosexuality.
In High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office,
even the "powerless-friendly" Ninth Circuit conceded that gays are too
politically powerful to be a suspect class when that court recognized that
"legislatures have addressed and continue to address the discrimination
suffered by homosexuals on account of their sexual orientation through
the passage of anti-discrimination legislation. Thus, homosexuals are not

107. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
I 08. See. e.g, GERSTMANN, supra note 80, at 67-75 (outlining cases subsequent to the influential Bowers· decision).
I 09. See id. at 66-67.
II 0. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Ill. Romer, 517 U.S. at 645-46 (1996). Of course, gay rights advocates often point to Romer
v. Evans as a victory case for their efforts because Colorado's controversial constitutional amendment 2, which thwarted the state's granting of "special rights" to the gay community, was struck
down on equal protection grounds. However, this victory may be fairly characterized as a small or
hollow one at best because the Supreme Court's majority, employing silently-heightened or "secondorder" rational-basis review, did not elevate the gay class to a higher level of scrutiny. Therefore, in
the long run,
Romer sends the signal to lower-court judges that they may have a freer hand to strike
down antigay laws that happen to seem unfair to them by silently raising the level of
scrutiny applied to those laws. This is not constitutional protection-it leaves gays and
lesbians at the whim of the judiciary .... [T]hey can only hope that the particular judges
who hear their cases happen to consider that treatment unfair. Most often, they have not.
GERSTMANN, supra note 80, at 13 7.
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without political power; they have the ability to and do 'attract the attention of lawmakers. "' 112
Again, on the other side of this argument, proponents of gay rights
under the equal protection penumbra have convincing arguments. These
advocates assert, perhaps rightfully, that courts have engaged in using
double standards against gays. Particularly noteworthy is the Supreme
Court's "suspect classification" versus "suspect class" standard. 113
Whites and males, who do not belong to any suspect class, benefit
from this double standard. For example, in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 114 Alan Bakke, a student seeking admissions to the
Medical School of the University of California at Davis, claimed that he
was disadvantaged because he was white. Notably, the Supreme Court
did not ask whether Bakke belonged to a politically powerless "class."
Rather the Court switched gears by inquiring whether Bakke had been
subjected to state policies and laws based on the forbidden "classification" of race. Therefore, the Supreme Court extended strict scrutiny review to Bakke's situation even though Bakke was a member of the politically powerful non-suspect white class. 115 Gay rights advocates
logically posit, therefore, that if strict scrutiny can apply to privileged
white males, why should courts ask gays to prove that they are powerless
victims?
V. TOWARD A RESOLUTION
Until this point, this Comment has highlighted (I) how the gay rights
sensitivity training approach, a recent non-legal or educational phenomenon in the public workplace and (2) how the equal protection framework,
a more established legal approach, have attempted to provide the treatment that gays seek. In light of what the gay community really desires,
neither will likely prove successful. When the state mandates compulsory
attendance to a training workshop that, by its very nature, presents only
one side of this morally controversial issue, and when the state mandates,
112. High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990)
(emphasis added). Many legal scholars have also advanced this point. Representative of such scholars, Professor Richard Duncan has opined that unlike "racial and ethnic minorities and other groups
protected by anti-discrimination laws ... homosexuals have not been economically impoverished by
pervasive and invidious discrimination." Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 444
(1994 ).
113. See, e.g., GERSTMANN, supra note 80, at 84-90.
114. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
115. Whites are not the only beneficiaries of this double standard. The Supreme Court has also
used "classification" rather than "class" to apply heightened review to males even though males are
not members of a politically powerless class. See GERSTMANN, supra note 80, at 87-88. See, e.g.,
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 ( 1976).
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by judicial edict rather than by representative legislation, that one side of
this morally controversial issue shall have its rights elevated, gay rights
proponents still lose. Specifically, the following sections highlight this
problem and explain: (I) what change(s) gays optimistically seek from
the law; (2) how the gay community would more likely achieve these
changes if they tum to, rather than away from, religious influence; and
(3) why the gay community should rely upon its shared characteristics
with religion to develop a principled-basis (rather than state-assisted basis) for potentially changing the culture as well as its laws.
A. Of Culture Shifting

Opponents of gay rights legislation have commented that gay rights
advocates seek not a change in the law but a "forced . . . cultural
change ... requiring all of society to give full approval to homosexuality."116 This may be somewhat extreme, but gay rights advocates would
likely agree that "[u]ltimately, lesbians and gay men desire not only legal
change, but a change in societal attitudes as well." 117 Few agree, however, on how to effectuate that change.
1. New Zealand's experiment

In the early 1990s, New Zealand enacted massive sexual orientation
discrimination reform. 11 x New Zealand's parliament not only passed an
anti-discrimination law but also repealed its military stance regarding the
gays in its armed services, abolished sodomy as a crime, and gave residency status to same-sex partners of New Zealand citizens. 119 Gay rights
advocates were chagrined to learn, however, that New Zealand was a
progressive society only on paper because "it merely had the formal rules
that ought to govern an utopia that includes lesbians and gay[s]." 120 Despite New Zealand's lawmaking, its gay citizens still lived in the shadows of the national culture. Apparently, a streamlined national government that perceives itself as progressive had effected some changes in

I 16. Response to the Gay Rights Agenda at www.capitolresource.org/rcspon.htm (last visited
Nov. 5, 2001 ).
I 17. Marc L. Rubinstein, Note, Gay Rights and Religion: A Doctrinal Approach to the Argument rlwt Anri-Gay-Rights Initiatives Violate the Establishment Clause, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1585,
1620 ( 1995 ). Ciay rights advocates generally argue for the accomplishment of three goals: (i) protection !rom discrimination, especially in employment, housing, etc.; (ii) freedom from intrusion and
harassment, particularly from the hands of the government; and (iii) some degree of recognition of
gay rclationshirs. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make
Social Change, 72 N. Y.U. L. Rl V. 967,968 (1997).
I 18. See Stoddard, supra note 117, at 969.
I 19. See id. at 968-969.
120 !d at 969.
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the rules, but the cultural climate was decades behind that of even the
United States. 121
To change a society's values requires more than tinkering with its legal system. It requires a process similar to one experienced during the
American Civil Rights era of the late 1950s and early 1960s. 122 When introducing such social legislation, lawmakers have at least five goals.
First, under a lawmaking paradigm, lawmakers seek (1) to create new
rights and remedies for victims and (2) to alter the conduct of the government. 123 Second (especially subsequent to the civil rights movement,
which sought to make change in extralegal ways by seeking social
change and by seeking to improve the society in fundamental ways), 124
under a culture shifting paradigm, lawmakers seek (3) to alter the conduct of citizens and other private entities; (4) to express a new moral
ideal or standard; and (5) to change cultural attitudes and pattems. 125

2. Enhancing the likelihood of transcending lawmaking into a culture
shift: Lessons from the civil rights era
When interested parties, such as gay rights advocates, desire to
achieve the second-order type of laws-laws which assist in culture
shifting-they must consider the source of the new rules. The source of
new social rules is critical. Generally speaking, legislative rules rather
than judicial rules are more likely to effect cultural change. For example,
U.S. citizens in some regions disliked Congress's 1964 civil rights package, but they did not rise in rebellion. If, however, the 1964 Act had issued from the bench of the U.S. Supreme Court, the decision would have
been perceived as illegitimate, high-handed, and undemocratic. 126
That is not to say, however, that the judiciary does not have a crucial
role to play in the lawmaking to culture shifting process. In the United
States' experience, its high court prepped the national legislature with its
landmark Brown v. Board of Education 127 case among others. This provided ten years of examination, reflection, and debate, which, in tum,

121. See id. at 971~72.
122. See infra V.A.2.
123. See Stoddard, supra note 117, at 972.
124. See id. at 973.
125. See id. at 972. After passing such social legislation, the affected society may determine
whether lawmaking has effected culture shifting when there is a sense of (I) a change that is very
broad or profound; (2) public awareness of that change; (3) legitimacy of the change; and (4) overall,
continuous enforcement of that change. See id. at 978. Again, reflection upon the United States'
Civil Rights Act of 1964 serves as an effective model of measuring culture shift.
126. See id. at 977.
127. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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enhanced the legitimacy of the subsequent civil rights product. 128 In
short, "[l]awsuits are effective at highlighting problems," but ineffective
at long-term resolutions of deep cultural issues because the judiciary is
rule focused rather than focused on the culture that sustains the rules. 129
When it comes to culture shifting, "[p ]rocess matters. How a rule
comes about may, in the end, be as important as what it says." 130 Therefore, gay rights advocates should focus on legislatures, despite the inherent difficulties in that arduous process, rather than focus intently on the
courts. William N. Eskeridge, a leading gay rights advocate, adds that
gay radicals would be ... naive ... if they believed that gay equality
trumps the rights of everybody else. It would be naive, because we are
the new "rights group" on the block, and human beings and their institutions require time and struggle to internalize a new group. 131

It must not be overlooked, however, that lawmaking is important

even if it only modifies behavior and never accomplishes the cultural
shift in attitude. Martin Luther King, Jr. said of the civil rights laws:
[E]ven though morality may be legislated, behavior can be regulated.
And this is very important. ... It may be true that the law can't make a
man love me, but it can keep him from lynching me, and I think that's
.
pretty Important
aIso. 132

Therefore, to achieve any hope of culture shift, gay rights advocates
must remove themselves from the equal protection quagmire. A judicial
decision, even from the Supreme Court, granting gays the suspect class
status that they seek is unlikely to accomplish culture shift. Therefore,
the gay community should continue its current state-by-state, municipality-by-municipality approach, 133 because what this approach lacks in national uniformity, it compensates for in regional credibility. Also, the
state, as public employer, must get out of the business of compelling its
employees to attend gay sensitivity seminars. Endorsing one viewpoint
over others in this morally controversial area spells increased cultural resentment rather than desired culture shift.

128. See Stoddard, supra note 117, at 984.
129. /d. at 985-86.
130. /d. at 991.
131. Eskcridgc, supra note 37, at 2473 (emphasis added).
132. Alfred J. Sciarrino, Civil Ri[<hts: ReliJ<ion in the Public Sphere, 30 How. L.J. 1127, 1133
(quoting J. WASHINGTON, A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR. 480 ( 1986) ).
133. See supra Part 11.8.2.
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3. Another lesson the gay rights movement should learn from the civil
rights era

Pitting a religious defense against civil rights is not new, 134 but
Altman is among the recent handful of cases to move this debate into the
employment arena. 135 Typically, contemporary advocates of gay rights
consistently complain about the religious opposition's tactics. The
ACLU's director of the National Gay and Lesbian Rights Project, Matthew Coles, opines that "there is a very concerted effort to say religious
freedom should give you an out from civil rights law. 'This is the defense
dujour."' 136 Other advocates agree that "religious freedom [is] a smokescreen for discrimination." 137 Some advocates see religion as such a catalyst behind many of the anti-gay-rights initiatives throughout the Union
that an establishment clause defense should be mounted. Clearly antigay-rights legislation, they say, at the very least entangles the state with
religiously motivated organizations seeking to roll back gay rights victories. 138 However, "[w ]hile political activity by religious groups today
may be perceived as dangerous by some, the lessons of the Civil Rights
era [teach otherwise]." 139
To achieve culture shift, gay rights advocates need to see religious
factions within our society not as the enemy but as a potential ally. The
United States Supreme Court sagely recognized the deleterious affects of
leaving American religion out of society's culture shifting process when
Justice Brennan stated that "churches as much as secular bodies and private citizens" have the right to "take strong positions on public issues including ... vigorous advocacy oflegal or constitutional positions." 140
If history teaches anything, it teaches not only that religion as a culturally conservative institution may raise objections to culture shifts such
as women advancing into the workplace or interracial marriage 141 but
also that, historically, church leaders have been advocates at the forefront
of political struggles-especially the culture-shifting struggles-for the
abolition of slavery, for the granting of universal suffrage for women,
and for passage of comprehensive civil rights reform. 142 Hubert Hum-

134.
135.
136.
137.
15,2000.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
Baker, supra note 66, at 18.
Government Supports Gay Protections in Louisville Case, FEDERAL EEO ADVISOR, Sept.
See Rubinstein, supra note 117, at 1592.
Sciarrino, supra note 132, at 1129.
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618,640-641 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring).
See Baker, supra note 66, at 19.
See Sciarrino, supra note 132, at 1129, 1131.

287] ANTI-DISCRIMINATION RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE

311

phrey emphatically declared that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 could not
have been passed without the backing it received from the nation's
churches, 143 where church leaders aroused the nation's conscience "and
religious individuals put their bodies on the 1ine." 144
B. Reconciliation and Building upon Common Ground
Although, at first glance, religious freedom and sexual orientation
freedom tend to collide as bipolar opposites in contemporary American
culture, in reality, these two principles share much in common. Connecting religion and sexual orientation may, from a religious perspective, be
an act of profanity or sacrilege; however, at a minimum, these two forces
are bound by a common history of persecution and prejudice. 145
1. Similarities between religion and sexual orientation
Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer 146 implicitly connects religion and
sexual orientation when he refers to the morally controversial kulturkampf in which these two forces are engaged. 147 Kulturkampf means
"culture struggle." The term's popular usage may be traced to German
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's campaign to assimilate or force conformity upon his state's Roman Catholics between 1871 and 1887. 148 A cultural struggle need not involve the state, but when the state foregoes its
neutrality, in the long-term, both sides of the struggle lose because stateendorsed coercion rarely achieves cultural shift. Of course, statesanctioned kulturkampf is not foreign to the American experience.
Within the area of gay rights, for instance, during the Post-World War II
era that culminated in the Stonewall riots of 1969, 149 America engaged in
its own kulturkampf against gays. 150
Religion and sexual orientation, however, share more than a common
history of state-endorsed persecution. 151 For example, in general terms,

143. See A. JAMI·:S RI'ICIII.I·:Y, REI.IGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 169 (1985).
144. Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 401.
145. See Eskeridge, supra note 37, at 2474.
146. 517 U.S. 620 ( 1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. See id. at 634. Justice Scalia states: "The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of
spite .... I vigorously dissent." !d.
148. See Eskeridge, supra note 37, at 2413-14.
149. See generally RlJTIIANN ROBSON, GAY MEN, LESBIANS, AND THE LAW (Martin Duberman cd., 1994 ).
150. Justice Scalia would probably argue that the state did not improve society's aggregate lot
by switching sides in the Romer decision.
151. Professor Eskeridge highlights this historical similarity when he scrutinizes gay persecution in light of the United States kulturkamp against the Mormons. See Eskeridge, supra note 37, at
2421-27.
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unlike the protected classes of race and gender, neither are superficially
discemible. 152 Physical appearance in today's workplace no more reveals
a worker's sexual orientation than it reveals a worker's religious affiliation. Moreover, individuals with similar sexuality values, like those who
share similar religious sentiments, tend to seek out a larger community
with which to associate. 153 Also, religion and sexuality differentiation
tends to occur within individuals' thoughts and actions. Religious adherents, for example, form a belief and bond with God and their actions of
prayer or service to others conform with this underlying system of
thought and emotion. Gays also form within their thoughts a strong emotional or physical connection and seek to interact, even sexually, with
that "other." 154 Finally, adherents tend to think of their religion or sexual
orientation as a natural "given," while others of another faith or sexual
orientation are viewed as having "chosen" (albeit incorrectly) theirs. 155
Of course, there are tremendous differences between religion and
sexual orientation. The "other" in one context is a Supreme Being that
relies upon faith to maintain a relationship; whereas, in the sexual orientation context, the "other" is a tangible person. Nevertheless, this and
other differences do not overcome the similarities which justify that we
treat these two issues, at least in the public sphere, similarly. At a minimum, gays deserve as much freedom from state-endorsed influences that
attempt to compel heterosexuality just as much as devout believers deserve freedom from coercive influences of compulsory atheism.

2. A proposal: The state should treat sexual orientation variation
similarly to how it treats religious variation
Not only do past achievements of religious-led culture shifts inform
the gay community how to implement prospective, non-coercive culture
shift, the very text of the United States Constitution does also. The inherent tensions within the First Amendment's free exercise clause and establishment clause offer gay rights seekers a means to achieve tolerance of
sexual orientation diversity the same way that diversity in religion has
achieved social tolerance. The free exercise clause of the First Amendment "prevents the state from censoring deviant religions and ... pre-

152. See id. at 2418.
153. See id. at 2419-20.
154. /d. at 2417.
155. /d. at 2419. Brian McNaught, a nationally distinguished presenter in gay sensitivity training seminars, notably equates employers wrestling with sexual orientation issues to the same struggles that employers face when grappling with religious issues in the workplace. See McNAUGHT,
supra note 40, at xv.
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vents the state from unduly discriminating against religious belief." 156
The establishment clause, on the other hand, prevents the state from imposing its own view of religious orthodoxy upon its citizens. Together,
these respective clauses provide that the state must allow normative
groups the opportunity to wither or flourish, and the state, unlike Chancellor Bismark's German state, should not become the means for the triumph of one community over all the others. 157 In other words, "[t]hese
[First Amendment] principles balance the interests of people of competing, and indeed antithetical, views and thus achieve a kind of neutraliry"-religious adherents are assured protection, and secularists are assured that the government will not promote religion. 158
Although it is almost certain that a national amendment for sexual
orientation would never pass, perhaps it would be fruitful to address the
culture's concerns in this controversial area by approaching legislation in
a fashion similar to the Founders' approach to the controversial area of
religious belief. Analogizing sexual orientation issues to the free exercise
clause, gay rights advocates could freely assert that homosexuality is
normal, natural, and moral while traditional sexuality advocates could
maintain their view that homosexuality is abnormal, unnatural, and immoral. Both sides are worthy of the respect granted to these antithetical
positions 159-atheists and believers, gays and straights alike. Moreover,
analogizing sexual orientation issues to the establishment clause is consistent with the notion that morally controversial issues are not for the
government to decide. 160 Neither a judge sitting in Washington, D.C., nor
a government bureaucrat working in Minnesota is any more competent to
judge religious truth than sexual truth.
Of course, both sides of the sexual orientation issue are likely to resent this approach. Gay rights advocates would probably accept the free
exercise approach, but not welcome a disestablishing position because
such advocates often want to use the state to teach that opposition to homosexuality is bigotry and the state should inflict penalties upon those
who discriminate on its basis. 161 Traditional advocates would resist implementing either clause, particularly the establishment clause because

156. Eskeridge, supra note 37, at 2415.
157. See id.
158. Michael W. McConnell, What Would It Mean To Have a "First Amendment" for Sexual
Orientation, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION & HUMAN RIGHTS IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE 235
(Saul M. Olyan & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1998) (emphasis added).
159. See id. at 235.
160. See id.
16 I See id. at 235-36.
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such advocates want to maintain a certain level of official stigma to discourage homosexual behavior. 162
Both sides' respective agendas, however, fail to appreciate the "culture-benefiting" aspect of such a constitutional approach. The first clause
commits sexual orientation to the private sphere and, therefore, eliminates the need for public agreement: Each side can go its own way. 163
The second clause grants equal access: "allow[ing] the competing groups
to participate in the public sphere on equal terms." 164 Government is restrained from expressing a view either way. This approach enhances the
likelihood of an enduring culture shift in the workplace and beyond. A
government, however, that resorts to championing one side of this issue
by proclaiming "Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Pride Month"
and mandating that its public employees be sensitized to this issue sacrifices long-term culture shift at the altar of perceived enlightenment. 165
VI. CONCLUSION
Controversial issues such as religious freedom and sexual orientation
will always be with us, especially in the workplace where we are compelled to interact with one another. Our task, therefore, in a free and pluralistic society, is not to extinguish or unduly limit these core fundamentals. Rather our challenge is to create policy structures that will allow for
the individual expression of either without harming the commonwealth
or the aggregate whole of society. We have, relative to the rest of the
world, achieved this for religion with our Constitutional "first" religious
rights. This First Amendment, richly complemented by our heritage of
religious jurisprudence and experience, provides a principled basis upon
which to do this for other normative communities. By applying the neutrality-based principles of the two religion clauses to sexual orientation,
we may reap the benefits that inure to a healthier pluralistic society rather

162. See id.
163. See id. at 237.
164. /d.
165. Some may argue that the contextual difference between religion and sexual orientation
limits some of these analogies. For example, the religion clauses at their inception and to this day
became effective in a social landscape of multiple religions. Some argue that, the sexual orientation
landscape is, on the other hand, bipolar in structure with each side claiming the moral high ground,
meaning that one side can only be right to the exclusion of the other; whereas, in the religion context, mutually exclusivity is not such an issue because many believers recognize that other faiths,
though "inferior," have some slivers of truth. See id. at 256. This argument, however, unduly oversimplifies the cultural context. As outlined above, it is unfair to characterize all of society by its
clashing moral extremes. Polling information and common reason inform us that, with regards to
issues relating to sexual orientation, Americans are strewn across the continuum of possibilities.
Therefore, just as a heterogeneous group of religious adherents benefit from neutrality-based free
exercise and establishment protection, so too should adherents to various views of sexual orientation.

287] ANTI-DISCRIMINATION RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE

315

than reap the burdens that accompany a pluralistic society that subtly
seeks to achieve homogeneity through unprincipled or coercive means.
Josiah N. Drew

